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DISCUSSION
Eric Aarons
Jack Blake’s discussion piece (ALR, No. 74) 
raises vital issues which include, but go beyond, 
Afghanistan.
Referring specifically to Eqbal Ahmad 
(Interview in Afghanistan: Afghanistan: fact - 
opinion analysis, CPA publication), Jack says:
A section of the left has set up fixed criteria for 
granting legitimacy to revolution in a Third 
World country....
I do not agree with everything Ahmad says, but I 
think Jack’s criticism misses the main point, 
Ahmad approves the program of the People’s 
Democratic Party in Afghanistan, as I think we all 
do. But he legitimately points to the dangers in 
trying to implement such a program without 
sufficient mass support, particularly among those 
most affected — the peasantry.
Another section of the left, however, sets up 
criteria which are perilous indeed. Sam 
Goldbloom, for example, writes:
...with a population which is 95 per cent 
illiterate, where the working class is only one 
per cent, where feudalism and the 
fundamentalist Islamic religion has kept the 
people in the dark for ages....this nexus can be 
broken only by a small group drawn.from the 
intellectuals, progressives of various shades, 
including church leaders, and the nucleus of a 
marxist party. (Tribune, May 7, 1980).
While in Viet Nam recently, I had it put to me 
concerning Afghanistan that “ there are two kinds 
of revolution, one from the top and one from the 
bottom” .
I replied that this was the first time I had heard 
such a view advanced by marxists, who always
stressed the vital element of self-emancipation. I 
queried how the Vietnamese revolution could have 
survived had it lacked peasant support.
China, Cuba, Yugoslavia are also examples of 
mass involvement, however different the forms 
these revolutions took. They also refute the 
suggestion that “ illiterate peasants lack 
revolutionary potential. Leadership is, of course, 
necessary. But is it an acceptable revolutionary 
model for a leadership to proceed without mass 
support, whether in a Third World or capitalist 
country? And then to virtually make it obligatory 
to support the entry of massive outside force to 
make up for the internal lack?
All accounts of the situation in Afghanistan 
I have read, including those from supporters of 
what was done, admit the lack of peasant support,
I won’t canvas the evidence here, but suggest, for 
example, a reading of Fred Halliday's article in 
New Left Review, No. 119.
As to the general principles involved concerning 
acceptable outside aid, I suggested the following: 
political solidarity; material aid to remain under 
local control; aid not replacing local effort as the 
main force (Afghanistan, p. 76).
These may be inadequate criteria, but Jack does 
not suggest any others.
Imperialism active
Jack says: “ another view proceeds from the 
unspoken assumption that imperialism is not 
active in attempts to undermine and destroy 
revolutions in Third World countries” . I don’t 
know who on the left assumes this: I certainly 
don’t.
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The point is rather that imperialism is active 
everywhere, and if that alone were enough to 
justify intervention, armies would bemarching all 
over the place (as some of the trotskyist groups 
clearly want) and there would be no need for 
analysis of concrete cases.
One has to consider not only whether 
intervention is justified, but also whether that 
intervention will improve the internal situation. In 
Afghanistan, on both counts, the answer seems in 
the negative.
Jack thinks he finds a conflict between what I 
wrote and what Denis Freney wrote. My pointwas 
that the outside forces as seen on TV could hardly 
be taken as the main problem; Denis was pointing 
to evidence of the deteriorating internal situation. 
Our points are complementary rather than being 
in conflict.
Czechoslovakian parallel?
It is certainly not CPA policy to equate the two 
situations and few people in our party draw a 
parallel with Czechoslovakia in 1968, except 
perhaps in regard to involvement of Soviet forces 
in changing a leadership.
Jack may believe that the Soviet leadership no 
longer involves itself in this activity in general 
and did not do so in Afghanistan in particular. I 
hope it is true, but remain sceptical and think there 
was more than just a “ chaotic situation” when 
Amin was done in.
Nor do I think Jack’s assumption that Amin was 
the main source of factional conflict in the PDP is 
well established, except in the hindsight of the 
victors, who also now conveniently discover an 
association with the CIA.
Self-determination
Jack sees a danger of becoming rigid and one­
eyed in defending the right of self-determination. I
see a danger in this right being swept aside in the 
march of the big battalions and the demand to line 
up as required by self-appointed arbiters of 
strategy in “ the class struggle on an international
scale” .
This is not equivalent to viewing the principle of 
self-determination abstractly, and in the concrete 
case of Viet Nam I wrote:
(Our) support (for Viet Nam) is based on 
recognition that the Pol Pot regime, aided and 
abetted by China, invaded Viet Nam and 
refused all efforts at negotiation, and that 
Chinese hostility, soon to be manifested in 
military invasion, posed a threat to the 
continued ex is ten ce  o f a gen uin ely  
independent Viet Nam.
Destruction of the detested Pol Pot regime 
was a by-productand would not of itself justify 
Vietnamese intervention. And we believe that 
they should withdraw at the earliest possible 
moment, leaving the Kampucheans to 
exercise their right to self-determination. 
(Afghanistan: page 76)
Following a visit to Kampuchea and Viet Nam 
in June, the CPA delegation was able to further 
concretise the conditions under which we think 
that withdrawal should occur. (Tribune, July 2, 
1980)
In Uganda, also, overthrow of the regime of Idi 
Amin was effected by Tanzanian forces and 
dissident Ugandans following a destructive 
invasion of Tanzania.
Thus, while analysing particular cases and 
avoiding an abstract approach, the CPA considers 
that the principle of self-determination should be 
upheld for the reasons outlined in Afghanistan, 
page 75.
An example of the opposite line of thinking is 
found in the demand that the Eritreans and the 
Kurds should not, in the “broader interest” , 
struggle for independence or autonomy (Peter 
Symon in The Socialist, June 4, 1980).
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Maybe they should not — though that is open to 
question. But if they do so struggle, i8 their 
suppression by armed force to be justified in the 
name of socialism?
And can some country, or trend of opinion 
within the movement, set itself up as the final 
arbiters on such questions?
Automatic opposition to the Soviet Union?
Jack says: “The real danger (for the CPA, is not 
being asked to give unqualified support to any 
Soviet action but) is that of becoming locked into a 
position which compels automatic opposition to 
every ‘difficult’ action of the Soviet Union”.
To indicate the unreality of this assessment, I 
refer to my Comment on the Viet Nam-China 
conflict (ALR, No. 68):
We had to think about how to react if the 
Soviet Union had intervened. The lines along 
which our though ts were running were that we 
would have supported (Soviet) intervention 
against the Chinese invasion insofar as it 
helped Viet Nam and was a response to 
Vietnamese requests. But it would be 
conditional support —  conditioned by the 
degree to which we judged Soviet actions were 
also in pursuit o f other aims, unnecessarily 
escalated the conflict, etc.
In supporting Viet Nam and present Soviet 
assistance to it, are we 'switching back to the 
Russians’ in allegiance?
Not at all. We maintain our independent 
position.
Such an independent position does not 
preclude, but presupposes, support of, as well 
as opposition to, particular measures taken by 
various governments and parties, in 
accordance with our own assessment of those 
measures.
Equating blocs?
Nor is equation of the Soviet Union with the 
United States the CPA’s position. But we are not 
prepared to passively accept a situation in which 
we are willy nilly propelled into adhering to a bloc 
and following a bloc leader. I recently wrote:
It has been said that in a struggle between 
the Soviet Union and the United States, a 
‘class line' demands that one support the 
former without reservations against the latter.
If only the world were so simple!
And such an approach would reduce other 
countries and movements to a passive 
position, reinforcing the hegemony which bloc 
leaders are always trying to assert. In this
respect, though not in others, they may be 
equated.
The need today is rather for more forces, 
more countries and movements to have their 
own input into the world situation from the 
anti-imperialist side, for the perceptions of the 
Soviet leadership, made through the prism of 
national interests, are not always congruent 
with the needs of the movement in other 
countries, or as a whole. (Afghanistan, p.78.)
The present possibility of gravitating to 
uncritical submergence in one bloc arises 
particularly from the dangerous polarisation of 
the world today and the ‘freezing’ of policies and 
attitudes.
Relations between China and Viet Nam, for 
example, are pretty firmly set in a hostile course. 
And these relations do not exist in a vacuum, but 
are essentially related to the Sino-Soviet conflict, 
as is China’s lamentable gravitation to closer and 
closer collaboration with the United States.
We are likely to see more conflict in our region 
and in other parts of the world — conflicts 
expressing and pushing further forward the 
process of polarisation, and making more 
apparently compelling the demand that we give up 
our independent policy.
Despite such pressures, and although it is not 
immediately apparent what can be done to change 
things, I believe it would be a great mistake to 
regard the process of polarisation as total and 
already consummated, final and irrevocable.
The task before us requires much more flexibility 
than that. We should work to establish relations 
with all communist parties and radical 
movements with the aim of bringing our own mite 
to bear — on our own where necessary and in co­
operation with others where possible — to change 
alignments before they have completely hardened, 
leaving no one any latitude.
This is one of the aims of the non-aligned 
movement which Cuba, for example (president of 
the movement), perhaps now sees more urgently, 
post-Afghanistan, despite its differences with 
Yugoslavia.
When we do take up a firm position of support for 
one side (for example, Viet Nam in the present 
dispute with China), we should not do so on the 
assumption that the side we supportis, or has to be 
made out to be, composed only of angels.
If we think it right we should oppose (the Soviet 
Union in Afghanistan) or criticise (Vietnamese 
over-sweeping denunciation of everything 
Chinese, past and present).
We can do so without feeling that we are thereby 
weakening our anti-imperialist stand. I believe we 
are rather strengthening it.
